Ultra

Ultra (sometimes capitalised ULTRA) was the name used by the British for intelligence resulting from decryption of German communications in World War II. The term eventually became the standard designation in both Britain and the United States for all intelligence from high-level cryptanalytic sources. The name arose because the code-breaking success was considered more important than the highest security classification available at the time (Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra Secret.

Much of the German cipher traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine, hence the term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts."

Until the name "Ultra" was adopted, there were several cryptonyms for intelligence from this source, including Boniface. For some time thereafter, "Ultra" was used only for intelligence from this channel.

Later the Germans began to use several stream cipher teleprinter systems for their most important traffic, to which the British gave the generic code-name FISH. Several distinct systems were used, principally the Lorenz SZ 40/42 (initially code-named TUNNY) and Geheimfernschreiber (code-named STURGEON).

These also were broken, particularly TUNNY, which the British thoroughly penetrated. It was eventually attacked using the Colossus, considered to be the forerunner of the electronic programmable digital computer. Although the volume of messages read from this system was much smaller than that from the Enigma, they more than made up for it in their importance.

F.W. Winterbotham, in The Ultra Secret (1974), quotes the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. Eisenhower, as at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory in World War II.

Sources and history

Encrypted messages

Ultra material largely came from German cipher traffic. These messages were generated on several variants of an electro-mechanical rotor machine called "Enigma." The Enigma machine was widely thought to be in practice unbreakable in the 1920s, when a variant of the commercial Model D was first used by the German Navy. The German Army, Navy, Air Force, Nazi party, Gestapo, and German diplomats all used Enigma machines, but there were several variants (eg, the Abwehr used a four-rotor machine without a plugboard, and Naval Enigma used different key management from that of the Army or Air Force, making its traffic far more difficult to cryptanalyze). Each variant required different cryptanalytic treatment. The commercial versions were not so secure. Dilly Knox, of GC&CS, is said to have broken it during the 1920s.

Breaking the cipher

The fundamental break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932, just on the eve of Adolf Hitler's accession to power, by Marian Rejewski. The 27-year-old mathematician used advanced mathematics (group theory, particularly permutation theory) for the first time to crack the Enigma system. Together with two colleagues at the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau (Polish: Biuro Szyfrów), he went on to develop practical methods of decrypting Enigma traffic. They designed working "doubles" of the Enigmas and developed equipment and techniques which helped in finding the keys needed for decryption (including the "grill," "clock," cyclometer, cryptologic bomb, and perforated sheets). Well before 1938, much German Enigma traffic was being routinely decrypted by the Poles; but accelerating changes in German operations (encipherment procedures, frequency of key changes, greater rotor choice) and looming war led the Poles to share their achievements in Enigma decryption with France and England. This happened during the famous meeting at Pyry, in the Kabaty Woods south of Warsaw, on July 25, 1939. Since neither the French nor the British had succeeded in breaking Enigma traffic, this was a major windfall for Poland's western allies.

Armed with this Polish assistance, the British began work on German Enigma traffic. (Work that would be done after the outbreak of World War II in France, at PC Bruno outside Paris, would be strictly the domain of the Polish Cipher Bureau cryptologists who had escaped Poland.) Early in 1939 Britain's secret service had installed its Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, 50 miles (80 km) north of London, to work on enemy message traffic. They also set up a large interception network to collect enciphered messages for the cryptologists at Bletchley and at five near-by off-site outstations at Adstock, Gayhurst, Wavendon, Stanmore, and Eastcote. Eventually there would be a very large organization controlling the distribution of the resulting – secret – decrypted information, which in time came to be called "Ultra." Strict rules were established to restrict the number of people who knew about the existence of Ultra in the hope of ensuring that nothing (e.g., leaks, actions) would alert the Axis powers that the Allies were reading their messages. Earlier in the war, the product from Bletchley Park was codenamed "Boniface" to give the impression to the uninitiated that the source was a secret agent. Such was the secrecy surrounding reports from "Boniface" that "his" reports were taken directly to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a locked box to which he personally held the key.

The Bletchley Park workers included a mix of crossword enthusiasts, chess mavens, mathematicians and pioneer computer scientists. Among the latter was Alan Turing, one of the founders of modern computing. By 1943, a large proportion of intercepts (over 2,000 daily at the height of operations) were routinely read, including some from Hitler himself. Such information enabled the Allies to maintain an accurate picture of enemy plans and orders of battle, and when appropriately used was of great value in formulating Allied strategy and tactics.

Methods of attack

British attacks on the Enigmas were similar to the original Polish methods, but naturally continued evolving to keep pace with the growing complexity of German equipment and procedures. (For a discussion of the many identical techniques used by the Poles and the British, see Kozaczuk 1984, appendix F.) A particular challenge would be German Naval Enigma. Even before the war, it had been a challenge to the Poles; only a portion of Naval Enigma had been read at B.S.-4 (the Cipher Bureau's German section) due to limited Bureau personnel and resources and because knowledge of army and air force traffic had been deemed more important to Poland's defense. (Kozaczuk, pp. 31, 58.)

One mode of attack on the Enigma relied on the fact that the reflector (a patented feature of the Enigma machines) guaranteed that no letter could be enciphered as itself, so an A could not be sent as an A. Another technique counted on common German phrases, such as "Heil Hitler" or "please respond," which were likely to occur in a given plaintext; a successful guess as to a plaintext was known at Bletchley as a crib. With a probable plaintext fragment and the knowledge that no letter could be enciphered as itself, a corresponding ciphertext fragment could often be identified. This provided a clue to message keys.

On some occasions, German cipher clerks helped the Allied cryptanalysts. In one instance, a clerk was asked to send a test message, and hit the T key repeatedly and transmitted the resulting letters. A British analyst received from an intercept station a long message containing not a single "T" and immediately realised what had happened. In other cases, as they had before the war, Enigma operators would constantly use the same settings for their message keys, often their own initials or those of a girlfriend (one apparently had the initials "C.I.L.," so Bletchley Park named such hints "cillies"). Analysts were set to finding such messages in the sea of daily intercepts, which winnowed out enough possibilities to allow Bletchley to use other original Polish techniques as well to find the initial daily keys. Other German operators used "form letters" for daily reports, notably weather reports, so the same crib might be used every day.

Had the Germans ever replaced every rotor at the same time, the British might not have been able to break back into the system. And had German operating practices been more secure, things would have been much more difficult for the British cryptologists. However, due to the expense and difficulty of getting new rotors to all ships and units, this was never done. Instead the Germans every so often added new rotors to the mix, thereby allowing the British to work out the wirings of the newest rotors.

Use of Ultra

Usable Ultra information came too late to be of great help during the Battle of Britain.

The Allies were seriously concerned to conceal from the Axis command that they had broken into Enigma traffic. This was taken to the extreme that, for instance, though they knew from intercepts the whereabouts of U-boats lying in wait in mid-Atlantic, the U-boats often were not hunted unless a "cover story" could be arranged — a search plane might be "fortunate enough" to sight the U-boat, thus explaining the Allied attack. Ultra information was used to attack and sink many Afrika Korps supply ships bound for North Africa; but, as in the North Atlantic, every time such information was used, an "innocent" explanation had to be provided: often scout planes were sent on otherwise unnecessary missions, to ensure they were spotted by the Germans. The British were, it is said, more disciplined about such measures than the Americans, and this difference was a source of friction between them.

The distribution of Ultra information to Allied commanders and units in the field involved considerable risk of discovery by the Germans, and great care was taken to control both the information and knowledge of how it was obtained. Liaison officers were appointed for each field command to manage and control dissemination.

In the summer of 1940, British cryptanalysts, who were successfully breaking German Air Force Enigma-cypher variants, were able to give Churchill information about the issuing of maps of England and Ireland to the Sealion invasion forces.

From the beginning, the Naval version of Enigma used a larger selection of rotors than did the Army or Air Force versions, as well as operating procedures that made it much more secure than other Enigma variants. There was no hint at all to the initial settings for the machines, and there was little probable plaintext to use, either. Different and far more difficult methods had to be used to break into Naval Enigma traffic, and with the U-boats running freely in the Atlantic after the fall of France, a more direct approach recommended itself.

On 7 May 1941 the Royal Navy deliberately captured a German weather ship, together with cipher equipment and codes; and 2 days later U-110 was captured, together with an Enigma machine, code book, operating manual and other information that enabled Bletchley Park to break submarine messages until the end of June. And it was done again shortly afterwards.

Naval Enigma machines or settings books were captured from a total of 7 U-boats and 8 German surface ships. These included U-boats U-505 (1944) and U-559 (1942) and a number of German weather boats and converted trawlers such as the Krebs, captured during a raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway. More fantastic scenarios were contemplated, such as Ian Fleming's James Bondian suggestion to "crash" captured German bombers into the sea near German shipping, hoping they would be "rescued" by a ship's crew, which would be taken captive by commandos concealed in the plane who would capture the cryptographic material intact.

In other cases, the Allies induced the Germans to provide them with cribs. To do this they would drop mines (or take some other action), then listen for messages thus provoked. In the case of mining this or that channel, they expected the word "Minen" to occur in some of the messages. This technique was, at Bletchley, called gardening.

Even these brief periods were enough to markedly affect the course of the war. Charting decrypted Enigma traffic against British shipping losses for a given month shows a strong pattern of increased losses when Naval Enigma was blacked out, and vice versa. But by 1943 so much traffic had been decrypted that Allied cryptologists had an excellent understanding of the messages coming from various locations at various times. Thus a brief message sent from the west at 6 a.m. was likely to have been broadcast by a weather-reporting boat in the Atlantic, and that meant the message would almost certainly contain these cribs; and similarly for other traffic. From this point on, Naval Enigma messages were being read constantly, even after changes to the ground settings.

However, the new tricks only reduced the number of possible settings for a message. The number remaining was still huge, and due to the new rotors that the Germans had added from time to time, that number was much larger than the Poles had faced. In order to solve this problem the Allies, especially the US, "went industrial" and produced much larger versions of the Polish bomba that could rapidly test thousands of possible key settings.

Some Germans had suspicions that all was not right with Enigma. Karl Dönitz received reports of "impossible" encounters between U-boats and enemy vessels which made him suspect some compromise of his communications. In one instance, three U-boats met at a tiny island in the Caribbean, and a British destroyer promptly showed up. They all escaped and reported what had happened. Dönitz immediately asked for a review of Enigma's security. The analysis suggested that the signals problem, if there was one, wasn't due to the Enigma itself. Dönitz had the settings book changed anyway, blacking out Bletchley Park for a period. However, the evidence was never enough to truly convince him that Naval Enigma was being read by the Allies. The more so, since his counterintelligence B-Dienst group, who had partially broken Royal Navy traffic (including its convoy codes early in the war), supplied enough information to support the idea that the Allies were unable to read Naval Enigma. Coincidentally, German success in this respect almost exactly matched in time an Allied blackout from Naval Enigma.

In 1941 British intelligence learned that the German Navy was about to introduce M4, a new version of Enigma with 4 rotors rather than 3. Fortunately for the Allies, in December a U-boat mistakenly transmitted a message using the four-rotor machine before it was due to be inaugurated. Realizing the error, the U-boat retransmitted the same message using the 3-rotor Enigma, giving the British sufficient clues to break the new machine soon after it became operational on February 1, 1942. The U-boat network which used the four-rotor machine was known as Triton, codenamed Shark by the Allies. Its traffic was routinely readable.

It is commonly claimed that the breaks into Naval Enigma resulted in the war being a year shorter, but given its effects on the Second Battle of the Atlantic alone, that might be an underestimate.

Breaking of some messages (not in German Enigma) led to the defeat of the Italian Navy at Capa Matapan, and was preceded by another "fortuitous" search-plane sighting. British Admiral Cunningham also did some fancy footwork at a hotel in Egypt to prevent Axis agents from taking note of his movements and deducing that a major operation was planned. Ultra information was of considerable assistance to the British (Montgomery being "in the know" about Ultra) at El Alamein in Western Egypt in the long-running battle with the Afrika Korps under Rommel. Intelligence from signals between Adolf Hitler and General Günther von Kluge was of considerable help during the campaign in France just after the Allied D-Day landings, particularly in regard to estimates of when German reserves might be committed to battle.

By 1945 almost all German Enigma traffic (Wehrmacht, Navy, Luftwaffe, Abwehr, SD, etc.) could be decrypted within a day or two, yet the Germans remained confident of its security. Had they been better informed, they could have changed systems, forcing Allied cryptologists to start over. The Germans considered Enigma traffic so secure that they openly discussed their plans and movements, handing the Allies huge amounts of information. However, Ultra information was also at times misused or ignored. Rommel's intentions just prior to the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in North Africa in 1942 had been suggested by Ultra, but this was not taken into account by the Americans. Likewise, Ultra traffic suggested an attack in the Ardennes in 1944, but the Battle of the Bulge was a surprise to the Allies because the information was disregarded.

After the War, American TICOM project teams found and detained a considerable number of German cryptographic personnel. Among the things they learned was that German cryptographers, at least, understood very well that Enigma messages might be read; they knew Enigma was not unbreakable. They just found it impossible to imagine anyone going to the immense effort required. (See Bamford's Body of Secrets in regard to the TICOM missions immediately after the war.)

An intriguing question concerns alleged use of Ultra information by the "Lucy" spy ring. This was an extremely well informed, and rapidly responsive, ring which was able to get information "directly from the German General Staff Headquarters" — often on specific request. It has been alleged that "Lucy" was, in major part, a way for the British to feed Ultra intelligence to the Soviets in a way that made it appear to have come from highly-placed espionage and not from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. The Lucy ring was operated, apparently, by one man, Rudolf Roessler, and was initially treated with considerable suspicion by the Soviets. The information it provided was accurate and timely, and Soviet agents in Switzerland (including Alexander Rado, the director) eventually took it quite seriously.

Magic and Purple in Europe

In the Pacific theater, the Japanese cipher machine dubbed "Purple" by the Americans, and unrelated to the Enigmas, was used for highest-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. It was also cracked, by the US Army's Signal Intelligence Service. Some Purple decrypts proved useful elsewhere, for instance detailed reports by Japan's ambassador to Germany which were encrypted on the Purple machine. These reports included reviews of German strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections (in one case, of Normandy beach defenses) by the ambassador, and reports of long interviews with Hitler.

The Japanese are said to have obtained an Enigma machine as early as 1937, although it is debated whether they were given it by their German ally or bought a commercial version which, except for plugboard and actual rotor wirings, was essentially the German Army / Air Force machine.

Postwar public disclosure of Ultra

While it is obvious why Britain and the United States went to considerable pains to keep Ultra a secret until the end of the war, it has been a matter of some conjecture why Ultra was kept officially secret for 29 years thereafter, until 1974. During that period the important contributions to the war effort of a great many people remained unknown, and they were unable to share in the glory of what is likely one of the chief reasons the Allies won the war — or, at least, as quickly as they did.

At least three versions exist as to why Ultra was kept secret so long. Each has plausibility. All may be true. First, as David Kahn pointed out in his 1974 New York Times review of F.W. Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, after World War II the British gathered up all the Enigma machines they could find and sold them to Third World countries, confident that they could continue reading the messages of the machines' new owners. A second explanation relates to a misadventure of Winston Churchill's between the World Wars, when he publicly disclosed information obtained by decrypting Russian secret communications; this had prompted the Russians to change their cryptography, leading to a cryptological blackout. The third explanation is given by Winterbotham (The Ultra Secret, introduction), who recounts that two weeks after V-E Day Churchill requested that former recipients of Ultra intelligence be asked not to divulge the source or the information they had received from it, in order that there might be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for the Allies' enemies to blame it for their defeat.

Since it was British and, later, American message-breaking which had been the most extensive, this meant that the importance of Enigma decrypts to the prosecution of the war remained unknown. Discussion by either the Polish or the French of Enigma breaks carried out early in the war would have been uninformed regarding breaks carried out during the balance of the war. Nevertheless it was the public disclosure of Enigma decryption, in the book Enigma (1973) by French Intelligence officer Gustave Bertrand, that generated pressure to discuss the rest of the Enigma/Ultra story.

The British ban was finally lifted in 1974, the year that a key participant on the distribution side of the Ultra project, F.W. Winterbotham, published The Ultra Secret. Wintherbotham's book is very interesting, but is in error on many points. He worked on the operation to distribute Ultra to end consumers and, based on the evidence of his book, did not understand much about cryptology. Peter Calvocorressi's book, Top Secret Ultra (1980), is in this regard better written and more responsible. He was involved in Bletchley Park's intelligence analysis of decrypts, working between the cryptological operation and Winterbotham's distribution operation.

The official history of British intelligence in World War II was published in five volumes from 1979 to 1988. It was chiefly edited by Harry Hinsley, with one volume by Michael Howard. There is also a one-volume collection of reminiscences by Ultra veterans, Codebreakers (1993), edited by Hinsley and Alan Stripp.

As mentioned, after the war, surplus Enigmas and Enigma-like machines were sold to many countries around the world, which remained convinced of the security of the remarkable cipher machines. Their traffic was not so secure as they believed, however, which is of course one reason the British and Americans made the machines available. Switzerland even developed its own version of the Enigma, the NEMA, and used it for decades (at least into the late '70s).

Some information about Enigma decryption did get out earlier, however. In 1967 the Polish military historian Władysław Kozaczuk in his book Bitwa o tajemnice (Secret War) first revealed that the German Enigma had been broken by Polish cryptologists before World War II. The same year, David Kahn in The Codebreakers described the 1945 capture of a Naval Enigma machine from U-505 and mentioned, somewhat in passing, that Enigma messages were already being read by that time, requiring "machines that filled several buildings." In 1971 Ladislas Farago's The Game of the Foxes gave an early published version of the myth of the purloined Enigma that enabled the British (according to Farago, Alfred Dillwyn Knox) to crack the cipher (Farago mentions an Abwehr Enigma). By 1970 newer, computer-based ciphers were becoming popular as the world increasingly turned to computerised communications, and the usefulness of Enigma copies (and rotor machines generally) rapidly decreased. It was decided at this point to let the cat out of the bag, and revelations about some of Bletchley Park's operations were permitted in 1974.

The National Security Agency retired the last of its rotor-based encryption systems, the KL-7 series, in the 1980s.

Difficulties with some disclosures

Many accounts of the Enigma-decryption story, and of other World War II cryptological happenings, have been published. Several are unreliable in many respects. This can be traced to a number of causes:

  • First, not all the authors were in a position to know. Several books have been published by those on the Ultra distribution side at Bletchley Park, but work there was seriously compartmentalised, making it difficult to credit some episodes when they are due only to such a source. The story about Churchill deliberately not interfering with a Luftwaffe bombing of Coventry which was known through Enigma decrypts is one such. Peter Calvocoressi's book, Top Secret Ultra, contains a sounder account of the episode.
  • Second, the cryptanalytic work was tricky and quite technical. It requires someone with a considerable understanding of cryptanalysis, and of Enigma, to adequately comprehend -- or explain -- how either worked.
  • Third, documents have been 'lost' in secret archives. Those not actually lost have taken decades to be released to the public, and some are, presumably, still to be released. In any case, none of them were originally written, nor made available later, with historical clarity in mind; considerable perspective is required to make reasonable use of them.
  • Fourth, governments have chosen to keep secret or release information to serve their own purposes, not historical accuracy or completeness.
  • Fifth, several authors have had agendas which took precedence over accuracy in their reports. At least one incident is known of whole-cloth fabrication regarding British cryptanalytic progress on a particular World War II Japanese Navy cryptosystem. The account was claimed to have been written from the unpublished memoirs of an Australian cryptanalyst, but substantive parts of the published version appear to have been simply invented.
  • Sixth, many writers have not done their research. The fate of the German Enigma spy "Asché" was not publicly known till Hugh Sebag-Montefiore tracked down Asché's daughter about 1999. Her account appears in Sebag-Montefiore's book.

As with other history, but more than for most, the history of cryptology, especially its recent history, should be read carefully, due to its complexity and to possibly confusing or misleading agendas.

Ultra's strategic consequences

There has been controversy about the influence of Allied Enigma decryption on the course of World War II. Probably the question should be broadened to include Ultra's influence not only on the war itself, but on the postwar period as well.

Wartime consequences

An exhibit in 2003 on "Secret War" at the Imperial War Museum, in London, quoted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill telling King George VI: "It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war." Churchill's greatest fear, even after Hitler had suspended Operation Sealion and invaded the Soviet Union, was that the German submarine wolf packs would succeed in strangling sea-locked Britain. He would later write, in Their Finest Hour (1949): "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." A major factor that averted Britain's defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic was her regained mastery of Naval-Enigma decryption. However there were other technologies, equipment and tactics which moved the Battle of the Atlantic in the Allies' favour. As the air gap over the North Atlantic closed and convoys received escort-carrier protection, airborne anti-submarine aircraft became extremely efficient hunter-killers with the use of centimetric radar and airborne depth charges. Improvements to Huff-Duff (radio-triangulation equipment used as part of ELINT) meant that a U-boat's location could be found even if the messages they were sending could not be read. Improvements to ASDIC (sonar), coupled with Hedgehog depth charges, improved the likelihood of a surface attack sinking a U-boat.

From February 1942 when Air Marshal Arthur Harris became Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command, the RAF implemented large scale night area bombardment of German cities. The destruction of city centres not only destroyed factories, houses, and railways, but damaged and degrade the telephone network, which as the war progressed forced the German armed forces to rely ever more heavily on encrypted radio traffic, which of course the Allies were able to read.

After D-Day with the resumption of the strategic bomber campaign over Germany, Harris remained wedded to area bombardment. The historian Frederick Taylor argues that as Harris was not cleared to know about ULTRA, he was given some information gleaned from ENIGMA, but not where it had come from. This directly effected his attitude to the effectiveness of the post D-Day 1944 directives (orders) to target oil installations as he did not know that it was high level German sources which was being used by the Allied high command to assess just how much it was hurting the German war effort; so Harris tended to see the directives to bomb specific oil and munitions targets as a high level command "panacea" (his word), and as a distraction from the real task of making the rubble bounce in every large German city.[1]

Postwar consequences

F.W. Winterbotham, the first author to limn, in his 1974 book The Ultra Secret, the influence of Enigma decryption on the course of World War II, likewise made the earliest contribution to an appreciation of Ultra's postwar influence, which now continues into the 21st century — and not only in the postwar establishment of Britain's GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters) and the United States' NSA (National Security Agency). "Let no one be fooled," Winterbotham admonishes in chapter 3, "by the spate of television films and propaganda which has made the war seem like some great triumphant epic. It was, in fact, a very narrow shave, and the reader may like to ponder [...] whether [...] we might have won [without] Ultra."

Further reading

A fictional version of this story is told in the novel Enigma by Robert Harris (ISBN 0099992000), the movie made from the novel—see "Enigma (2001 film)"—and is somewhat covered, also fictionally, in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon (ISBN 0099410672).

A short account of World War II cryptology is Battle of Wits (2000) by Stephen Budiansky; it covers more than just the Enigma story. Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's Enigma: the Battle for the Code (2000), which focuses largely on Naval Enigma, includes some previously unknown information—and many photographs of individuals involved; Bletchley Park had been his grandfather's house before it was purchased for GC&CS. David Kahn's Seizing the Enigma (1991) is essentially about the solution of Naval Enigma, based on seizures of German naval vessels; British success in the endeavor almost certainly saved Britain from defeat in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic and thereby made the United States' entry into the war's European theater possible. A brief description of the Enigma, as well as other codes/ciphers, can be found in Simon Singh's The Code Book (1999). Information on British cryptology appears in the official history of British intelligence in World War II, edited by Sir Harry Hinsley; he also co-edited, with Alan Stripp, a volume of memoirs by participants in the British cryptological effort, Codebreakers: the Inside Story of Bletchley Park (1993). Marian Rejewski wrote a number of papers on his 1932 break into Enigma and his subsequent work on the cipher, well into World War II, with his fellow mathematician-cryptologists, Jerzy Różycki and Henryk Zygalski; most of Rejewski's papers appear in Władysław Kozaczuk's 1984 Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two (edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek), which remains the standard reference on the crucial foundations laid by the Poles for World War II Enigma decryption.

Broken Enigma messages are still extremely valuable today, as they provide some of the best surviving direct accounts of the Nazi war effort.

Notes

  1. ^  Fredrick Taylor Dresden:Tuesday 13 February 1945, Pub (NY): HarperCollins, ISBN 0060006765, Pub (Lon): Bloomsbury. ISBN 0747570787. page 202

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David Kahn's Seizing the Enigma (1991) is essentially about the solution of Naval Enigma, based on seizures of German naval vessels; British success in the endeavor almost certainly saved Britain from defeat in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic and thereby made the United States' entry into the war's European theater possible. Stopping the R32 comes in the form of blue-painted brake calipers with 345 mm discs at the front and 310 mm disks at the rear. Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's Enigma: the Battle for the Code (2000), which focuses largely on Naval Enigma, includes some previously unknown information—and many photographs of individuals involved; Bletchley Park had been his grandfather's house before it was purchased for GC&CS. As with the previous R32; there is permanent 4MOTION all wheel drive through 18" Zolder 20-spoke alloy wheels. A short account of World War II cryptology is Battle of Wits (2000) by Stephen Budiansky; it covers more than just the Enigma story. Going from 0 to 100 km/h will take a brisk 6.5 s, reducing to 6.2 s with the direct-shift gearbox. A fictional version of this story is told in the novel Enigma by Robert Harris (ISBN 0099992000), the movie made from the novel—see "Enigma (2001 film)"—and is somewhat covered, also fictionally, in Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon (ISBN 0099410672). It features a 3.2 L V6 FSI engine with 250 hp (184 kW) and reaches a top speed of 250 km/h.

It was, in fact, a very narrow shave, and the reader may like to ponder [...] whether [...] we might have won [without] Ultra.". In late September, the R32 will be sold in Europe. "Let no one be fooled," Winterbotham admonishes in chapter 3, "by the spate of television films and propaganda which has made the war seem like some great triumphant epic. However, it is already facing stiff competition from the Renault Mégane Trophy and to a greater degree, the Opel Astra OPC in Europe. Winterbotham, the first author to limn, in his 1974 book The Ultra Secret, the influence of Enigma decryption on the course of World War II, likewise made the earliest contribution to an appreciation of Ultra's postwar influence, which now continues into the 21st century — and not only in the postwar establishment of Britain's GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters) and the United States' NSA (National Security Agency). The GTI features Fuel Stratified Injection, a turbocharger and a direct-shift gearbox. F.W. The 5-door version is expected to arrive around the same time as the standard Golf sometime in Summer 2006.

This directly effected his attitude to the effectiveness of the post D-Day 1944 directives (orders) to target oil installations as he did not know that it was high level German sources which was being used by the Allied high command to assess just how much it was hurting the German war effort; so Harris tended to see the directives to bomb specific oil and munitions targets as a high level command "panacea" (his word), and as a distraction from the real task of making the rubble bounce in every large German city.[1]. The production Golf GTI was unveiled at the Los Angeles Auto Show in January, 2006 and the 3-door GTI appeared at United States dealerships beginning later that month. The historian Frederick Taylor argues that as Harris was not cleared to know about ULTRA, he was given some information gleaned from ENIGMA, but not where it had come from. The Golf V GTI is hailed as a return to form for the creator of the genre. After D-Day with the resumption of the strategic bomber campaign over Germany, Harris remained wedded to area bombardment. There will be no convertible version of the Golf V, as the Eos coupe-convertible (to be introduced in Spring 2006) will be marketed as a separate model, and does not share any body panels with another Volkswagen model - although it is based on the Jetta/Golf platform. The destruction of city centres not only destroyed factories, houses, and railways, but damaged and degrade the telephone network, which as the war progressed forced the German armed forces to rely ever more heavily on encrypted radio traffic, which of course the Allies were able to read. The Plus would replace the Variant station wagon in the Golf lineup, although the Variant might be released.

From February 1942 when Air Marshal Arthur Harris became Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command, the RAF implemented large scale night area bombardment of German cities. It is taller than the "regular" Golf but shorter than the Touran, the MPV version of the Golf. Improvements to ASDIC (sonar), coupled with Hedgehog depth charges, improved the likelihood of a surface attack sinking a U-boat. In December 2004, Volkswagen announced the Golf Plus variant of the Golf V. Improvements to Huff-Duff (radio-triangulation equipment used as part of ELINT) meant that a U-boat's location could be found even if the messages they were sending could not be read. All of the Golf's engines, including the VR6, have the engine mounting points in the same place, making it possible to remove one engine and replace it with another while making few other modifications to the car. As the air gap over the North Atlantic closed and convoys received escort-carrier protection, airborne anti-submarine aircraft became extremely efficient hunter-killers with the use of centimetric radar and airborne depth charges. Options for engines and transmissions vary from country to country, but the Golf is available in 4-cylinder and VR6 gasoline-powered versions and turbo direct injection diesel-engined models in most places, with transmission options that include manual, automatic, Tiptronic, and direct shift gearbox.

However there were other technologies, equipment and tactics which moved the Battle of the Atlantic in the Allies' favour. Indeed, the rear suspension of Golf V (a modified wishbone arrangement) bears an uncanny resemblance to that of the Focus. He would later write, in Their Finest Hour (1949): "The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril." A major factor that averted Britain's defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic was her regained mastery of Naval-Enigma decryption. In order to counter criticisms of the average dynamics of the previous model, it is widely reputed that Volkswagen "poached" from Ford the engineering team who designed the multi-link rear suspension system of the Ford Focus, widely regarded as the class benchmark for ride and handling. An exhibit in 2003 on "Secret War" at the Imperial War Museum, in London, quoted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill telling King George VI: "It was thanks to Ultra that we won the war." Churchill's greatest fear, even after Hitler had suspended Operation Sealion and invaded the Soviet Union, was that the German submarine wolf packs would succeed in strangling sea-locked Britain. For the presentation of the new Golf, Wolfsburg was renamed to Golfsburg for a week. Probably the question should be broadened to include Ultra's influence not only on the war itself, but on the postwar period as well. Sales of the fifth generation began in November 2003.

There has been controversy about the influence of Allied Enigma decryption on the course of World War II. The Official R32 FAQ: [2]. As with other history, but more than for most, the history of cryptology, especially its recent history, should be read carefully, due to its complexity and to possibly confusing or misleading agendas. The American R32 Registry aims to account for all 5,000 R32s sold in America. This can be traced to a number of causes:. The Golf R32's competitors (at the time of production) were the Subaru Impreza WRX STi and the Mitsubishi Lancer Evolution VIII, although, unlike these cars, the R32 was not run by Volkswagen in rally competitions, and lacked the playstation appeal and ultimate status as those cars. Several are unreliable in many respects. Volkswagen surprisingly sold all 5,000 R32s in America with little marketing and advertisements.

Many accounts of the Enigma-decryption story, and of other World War II cryptological happenings, have been published. This was a venture put out by Volkswagen which was considered to be a corporate gamble. The National Security Agency retired the last of its rotor-based encryption systems, the KL-7 series, in the 1980s. Each car was sold just 13 months later. It was decided at this point to let the cat out of the bag, and revelations about some of Bletchley Park's operations were permitted in 1974. Five thousand cars were produced and intended to be sold over a 2-year period. By 1970 newer, computer-based ciphers were becoming popular as the world increasingly turned to computerised communications, and the usefulness of Enigma copies (and rotor machines generally) rapidly decreased. In spite of outwardly appearing very similar to the 20th Anniversary GTI, the R32 shared the vast majority of its major components with the 3.2 L Audi TT.

The same year, David Kahn in The Codebreakers described the 1945 capture of a Naval Enigma machine from U-505 and mentioned, somewhat in passing, that Enigma messages were already being read by that time, requiring "machines that filled several buildings." In 1971 Ladislas Farago's The Game of the Foxes gave an early published version of the myth of the purloined Enigma that enabled the British (according to Farago, Alfred Dillwyn Knox) to crack the cipher (Farago mentions an Abwehr Enigma). Billed as the pinnacle of the Golf IV platform, the R32 included every performance, safety, and luxury feature VW had to offer including the all new 3.2 L VR6 engine, AWD, a new 6-speed manual transmission, independent rear suspension, automatic climate control, sport seats from Koenig, 18" OZ Aristo wheels, ESP, massive (334 mm) brakes, sunroof, and model specific bodywork. In 1967 the Polish military historian Władysław Kozaczuk in his book Bitwa o tajemnice (Secret War) first revealed that the German Enigma had been broken by Polish cryptologists before World War II. Again, due to unexpected popularity, Volkswagen (through Volkswagen of America) decided to sell the car in North America (except Canada) as the 2004 Volkswagen R32. Some information about Enigma decryption did get out earlier, however. In 2003 Volkswagen produced the Golf R32 in Europe. Switzerland even developed its own version of the Enigma, the NEMA, and used it for decades (at least into the late '70s). Upgraded disc brakes front (12.3" vented rotors) and rear (10.3" vented rotors) helped bring things to a stop, while red powder-coated calipers added a bit of flair to the package.

Their traffic was not so secure as they believed, however, which is of course one reason the British and Americans made the machines available. A 6-speed manual MQ350 transmission marked the most notable departure from the norm, and upgraded suspension stiffened up the ride and lowered the car approximately 40 mm (uprated springs and shocks, increased sway bar diameters, and revised bushings in the rear). As mentioned, after the war, surplus Enigmas and Enigma-like machines were sold to many countries around the world, which remained convinced of the security of the remarkable cipher machines. Mechanically speaking, this was the average GTI 1.8T GLS with a few exceptions. There is also a one-volume collection of reminiscences by Ultra veterans, Codebreakers (1993), edited by Hinsley and Alan Stripp. Volkswagen's premier 8-speaker Monsoon(tm) stereo system was also standard. It was chiefly edited by Harry Hinsley, with one volume by Michael Howard. This edition also came with a special golf ball shifter knob.

The official history of British intelligence in World War II was published in five volumes from 1979 to 1988. Aluminum trim came standard, complete with a numbered nameplate above the center console identifying the exact production number (US production only) of the vehicle and a black headliner. He was involved in Bletchley Park's intelligence analysis of decrypts, working between the cryptological operation and Winterbotham's distribution operation. All 20ths had a sunroof, black leathered with silver stitching steering wheel, shifter boot and emergency brake handle, and sporty black cloth Recaro bucket seats with silver stitching accents and a red 'GTI' emblem embroidered in the middle of the back rest. Peter Calvocorressi's book, Top Secret Ultra (1980), is in this regard better written and more responsible. The only true option was ESP, Volkswagen's stability control feature. He worked on the operation to distribute Ultra to end consumers and, based on the evidence of his book, did not understand much about cryptology. Unlike other models, there were no 'options' available.

Wintherbotham's book is very interesting, but is in error on many points. Inside, a few accents were noticeable. Winterbotham, published The Ultra Secret. Distribution of production was 50% Black magic pearl, 25% Jazz Blue and 25% Imola Yellow. The British ban was finally lifted in 1974, the year that a key participant on the distribution side of the Ultra project, F.W. These models were produced only in three colors: Imola Yellow, Jazz Blue and Black Magic Pearl. Nevertheless it was the public disclosure of Enigma decryption, in the book Enigma (1973) by French Intelligence officer Gustave Bertrand, that generated pressure to discuss the rest of the Enigma/Ultra story. Blackened headlights and dark-tinted tail lights added a distinctive look, while Votex front, rear, and side skirts along with a hatch spoiler and special edition 18" OZ Aristo alloy wheels complete the exterior transformation.

Discussion by either the Polish or the French of Enigma breaks carried out early in the war would have been uninformed regarding breaks carried out during the balance of the war. The rear was also accompanied by a vintage-look chrome rabbit. Since it was British and, later, American message-breaking which had been the most extensive, this meant that the importance of Enigma decrypts to the prosecution of the war remained unknown. On the outside, the 20th came with throwback red-lettered 'GTI' logos on the left front and right rear. The third explanation is given by Winterbotham (The Ultra Secret, introduction), who recounts that two weeks after V-E Day Churchill requested that former recipients of Ultra intelligence be asked not to divulge the source or the information they had received from it, in order that there might be neither damage to the future operations of the Secret Service nor any cause for the Allies' enemies to blame it for their defeat. Several special features distinguish this new GTI from the rest of the pack. A second explanation relates to a misadventure of Winston Churchill's between the World Wars, when he publicly disclosed information obtained by decrypting Russian secret communications; this had prompted the Russians to change their cryptography, leading to a cryptological blackout. This event, in 2003 marked the 20th anniversary of the GTI's first introduction to the US, then called the Rabbit.

Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, after World War II the British gathered up all the Enigma machines they could find and sold them to Third World countries, confident that they could continue reading the messages of the machines' new owners. Due to the popularity of a commemorative 25th anniversary edition GTI produced in Europe in 2002 (GTI 337 edition in North America), Volkswagen of America produced 4,200 so-branded '20th Anniversary Edition' GTIs and 4000 were shipped to the United States and 200 to Canada. First, as David Kahn pointed out in his 1974 New York Times review of F.W. only) | and more. All may be true. 18" BBS RC Wheels with 225/40-ZR18 High-Performance Summer Tires | Greatly improved sport suspension - 1" lower overall ride height | Votex body kit with front valance, side skirts, rear hatch wing and rear valance with 3" chromed exhaust tip | 315 mm (12.4") diameter vented front and 256 mm (10") rear vented brakes with red powder coated calipers | All-new six-speed MQ350 transmission | Recaro front seats in special "LeMans" red and black cloth with custom GTI embroidery | Brushed aluminum interior trim accents | Red stitching on steering wheel, shift boot, handbrake knob and seats | Special golf ball shift knob | Aluminum pedals with rubber inserts | Stainless steel exhaust with mild sound tuning | Red trimmed floor mats | Special exterior retro GTI badging | Monsoon sound system (U.S. Each has plausibility. Starting with a 180 hp 1.8T GTI GLS, the following extra equipment and changes have been made:.

At least three versions exist as to why Ultra was kept secret so long. This is a very unique car for the Volkswagen lover.". During that period the important contributions to the war effort of a great many people remained unknown, and they were unable to share in the glory of what is likely one of the chief reasons the Allies won the war — or, at least, as quickly as they did. "The GTI is the sport version of the Golf and since we didn't begin selling the GTI here until 1983, the name 337 seemed like a nice way to recognize the history of this vehicle and make it meaningful to our most enthusiastic drivers. While it is obvious why Britain and the United States went to considerable pains to keep Ultra a secret until the end of the war, it has been a matter of some conjecture why Ultra was kept officially secret for 29 years thereafter, until 1974. "The 337 name comes from the code name for the Golf model back in the early 1970s," said Frank Maguire, vice president in charge of sales and marketing at Volkswagen of America, Inc. The Japanese are said to have obtained an Enigma machine as early as 1937, although it is debated whether they were given it by their German ally or bought a commercial version which, except for plugboard and actual rotor wirings, was essentially the German Army / Air Force machine. Only 1,500 units are being produced for the American market with an additional 250 specifically for Canada and it only came in Reflex Silver.

These reports included reviews of German strategy and intentions, reports on direct inspections (in one case, of Normandy beach defenses) by the ambassador, and reports of long interviews with Hitler. and $32,900 in Canada. Some Purple decrypts proved useful elsewhere, for instance detailed reports by Japan's ambassador to Germany which were encrypted on the Purple machine. The price of the GTI 337 was $22,225 in the U.S. It was also cracked, by the US Army's Signal Intelligence Service. The GTI 337 was officially introduced at the New York Auto Show and made it to dealers by late May 2002. In the Pacific theater, the Japanese cipher machine dubbed "Purple" by the Americans, and unrelated to the Enigmas, was used for highest-level Japanese diplomatic traffic. Volkwagen mixed and matched engine, door and naming configurations, so it was possible to purchase a 3-door "GTI" with the 115 hp 2.0L engine and a 5-door "Golf" with the 180 hp 1.8T engine.

The information it provided was accurate and timely, and Soviet agents in Switzerland (including Alexander Rado, the director) eventually took it quite seriously. A 1.8 L turbocharged gas engine was introduced in 2000, along with the 2.8 L VR6. The Lucy ring was operated, apparently, by one man, Rudolf Roessler, and was initially treated with considerable suspicion by the Soviets. Available engines were a 2.0 L gasoline, 1.9 L turbocharged diesel TDI. It has been alleged that "Lucy" was, in major part, a way for the British to feed Ultra intelligence to the Soviets in a way that made it appear to have come from highly-placed espionage and not from cryptanalysis of German radio traffic. This model was introduced to North America in mid 1999. This was an extremely well informed, and rapidly responsive, ring which was able to get information "directly from the German General Staff Headquarters" — often on specific request. A choice of three and five-door hatchbacks or a five-door station wagon were available.

An intriguing question concerns alleged use of Ultra information by the "Lucy" spy ring. Engine choices included 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.3, 2.8 and 3.2  L gasoline engines, and a 1.9 L diesel, with power ranging from 68 to 150 PS (50 to 110 kW). (See Bamford's Body of Secrets in regard to the TICOM missions immediately after the war.). This Bosnian Mk.IV was for local market only. They just found it impossible to imagine anyone going to the immense effort required. The Golf IV was also made in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Vogošća (near Sarajevo) in TAS, where Mk.I and Mk.II models were also made. Among the things they learned was that German cryptographers, at least, understood very well that Enigma messages might be read; they knew Enigma was not unbreakable. The Golf IV was made in Germany, South Africa, Slovakia, Brazil, Mexico and Belgium.

After the War, American TICOM project teams found and detained a considerable number of German cryptographic personnel. As with the Golf II, a convertible version of the Golf IV was never made, although the Golf III Cabrio was facelifted to give it the frontal styling of the Golf IV hatchbacks. Likewise, Ultra traffic suggested an attack in the Ardennes in 1944, but the Battle of the Bulge was a surprise to the Allies because the information was disregarded. The average dynamics were reasonably well concealed in daily driving, though, and the car's reputation was unscathed. Rommel's intentions just prior to the Battle of the Kasserine Pass in North Africa in 1942 had been suggested by Ultra, but this was not taken into account by the Americans. However, the upgrade of the vehicle's interior materials and exterior details appeared to have been done at the expense of the vehicle's engineering. However, Ultra information was also at times misused or ignored. Overall the level of maturity of the design and its target audience were also evident - the humorous plays on the game of golf which resulted in special edition models of the three earlier generations being called "Golf Ryder", "Golf Driver", not to mention the GTI's "golf ball" gearlever knob were dropped.

The Germans considered Enigma traffic so secure that they openly discussed their plans and movements, handing the Allies huge amounts of information. It was a deliberate attempt to take the Golf further upmarket, with a high-quality interior and higher equipment levels. Had they been better informed, they could have changed systems, forcing Allied cryptologists to start over. The Golf IV was heavier and larger than its predecessors, but still became the biggest selling car in Europe at one point. By 1945 almost all German Enigma traffic (Wehrmacht, Navy, Luftwaffe, Abwehr, SD, etc.) could be decrypted within a day or two, yet the Germans remained confident of its security.
. Intelligence from signals between Adolf Hitler and General Günther von Kluge was of considerable help during the campaign in France just after the Allied D-Day landings, particularly in regard to estimates of when German reserves might be committed to battle. Together with the 'colour concept' version that was produced during the final months before the production of the Mk.VI version, the 25th Anniversary model will probably be seen as the one of the rarest MK.III models.

Ultra information was of considerable assistance to the British (Montgomery being "in the know" about Ultra) at El Alamein in Western Egypt in the long-running battle with the Afrika Korps under Rommel. The diesel model was only produce for the european market and wasn't sold in the UK. British Admiral Cunningham also did some fancy footwork at a hotel in Egypt to prevent Axis agents from taking note of his movements and deducing that a major operation was planned. The edition was sold in only 6 colour schemes and the 1000 number figures that were produced was as follows; 600 8 valve models, 150 16 valve models and 250 TDI models. Breaking of some messages (not in German Enigma) led to the defeat of the Italian Navy at Capa Matapan, and was preceded by another "fortuitous" search-plane sighting. Insurance was based on the standard GTI which made this version a very desirable model. It is commonly claimed that the breaks into Naval Enigma resulted in the war being a year shorter, but given its effects on the Second Battle of the Atlantic alone, that might be an underestimate. 3 optional extras were made available; electric sunroof, air conditioning and metallic black paintwork.

Its traffic was routinely readable. Brush stainless steel rear twin tailpipes on the exhaust and smoked front fog and indicator lamps to match the rear lamps. The U-boat network which used the four-rotor machine was known as Triton, codenamed Shark by the Allies. The red theme continued externally with a red striping on the bumpers and red brake calipers, the wheels were 16" split rim BBS alloys, visual simuliar to the 15" that were found on VR6 model. Realizing the error, the U-boat retransmitted the same message using the 3-rotor Enigma, giving the British sufficient clues to break the new machine soon after it became operational on February 1, 1942. These had the usual GTI specification but a came with checkered GTI logo'd Recaro sport seats, red seat belts, half-chrome golf ball gear knob, red stitching on the steering wheel and on the handbrake gatter and silver dialled instruments. Fortunately for the Allies, in December a U-boat mistakenly transmitted a message using the four-rotor machine before it was due to be inaugurated. In 1996 Volkswagen produced a limited 1000 special-edition 3-door '25th Anniversary' GTI's.

In 1941 British intelligence learned that the German Navy was about to introduce M4, a new version of Enigma with 4 rotors rather than 3. During the 1990s, Volkswagen sponsored three high-profile rock bands' European tours, and issued a special-edition Golf, with distinctive exterior markings, for each: the Golf Pink Floyd Edition (1994), the Golf Rolling Stones Edition (1995), and the Golf Bon Jovi Edition (1996). Coincidentally, German success in this respect almost exactly matched in time an Allied blackout from Naval Enigma. At 110 PS (81 kW/108 hp) for a 1.9 L engine, it wasn't the first diesel engine installed in a road car to achieve over 50 hp/L, but it showed the public that diesel engines could be powered without losing their fuel efficiency, while also retaining massive amounts of low-end torque, in the TDI's case, 235 N·m (173 lbf·ft) at 1900 rpm. The more so, since his counterintelligence B-Dienst group, who had partially broken Royal Navy traffic (including its convoy codes early in the war), supplied enough information to support the idea that the Allies were unable to read Naval Enigma. The Golf Mk.III was also the predecessor of the diesel craze that swept through Europe in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when Volkswagen introduced the pump-injector system in the Golf TDI in 1996. However, the evidence was never enough to truly convince him that Naval Enigma was being read by the Allies. Once again the Golf Driver version took its place as the official GTI-lookalike but with a more humble single-point injected 1.8 L engine.

Dönitz had the settings book changed anyway, blacking out Bletchley Park for a period. While underpowered compared to the VR6, it was still relatively popular with driving enthusiasts in Europe (North America didn't get the GTI version proper, but had the name applied to the VR6 engine). The analysis suggested that the signals problem, if there was one, wasn't due to the Enigma itself. The engine was the same enlarged to 2.0 L, with power now reaching 150 PS (110 kW/148 hp). Dönitz immediately asked for a review of Enigma's security. This model was greeted with a muted sense of disenchantment with the motoring press. They all escaped and reported what had happened. A 16-valve version of the third-generation Golf GTI was introduced in 1993.

In one instance, three U-boats met at a tiny island in the Caribbean, and a British destroyer promptly showed up. The convertible version was called the Cabrio. Karl Dönitz received reports of "impossible" encounters between U-boats and enemy vessels which made him suspect some compromise of his communications. Compare that to the Mk.II GTI that weighed 285 kg (629 lb) less but had only 139 PS (102 kW/137 hp) and a much smaller engine to tune (1.8 L). Some Germans had suspicions that all was not right with Enigma. A "best of breed" VR6 variant exists which was available in a well regarded "Highline" trim; this 2.8 L VR6 engine gave a significant boost in power to 174 PS (128 kW/172 hp) for the Mk.III, a car weighing only about 1285 kg (2836 lb). In order to solve this problem the Allies, especially the US, "went industrial" and produced much larger versions of the Polish bomba that could rapidly test thousands of possible key settings. The GTI variants (especially with the straight-four 4 cylinder engine) are considered to be the poorest of the performance Golfs, with significantly increased weight, but with minimal power increases.

The number remaining was still huge, and due to the new rotors that the Germans had added from time to time, that number was much larger than the Poles had faced. For the first time a station wagon derivative was produced. However, the new tricks only reduced the number of possible settings for a message. The third-generation Golf was elected Car of the Year in 1992. From this point on, Naval Enigma messages were being read constantly, even after changes to the ground settings. The third-generation Golf was launched in November of 1991, although it did not appear in North America until 1993. was likely to have been broadcast by a weather-reporting boat in the Atlantic, and that meant the message would almost certainly contain these cribs; and similarly for other traffic.
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Thus a brief message sent from the west at 6 a.m. For the last year of production, the Driver was given a carburetted version of the GTI's 1781cc engine. But by 1943 so much traffic had been decrypted that Allied cryptologists had an excellent understanding of the messages coming from various locations at various times. Introduced in 1988, it featured the GTI's exterior styling, namely the twin front headlamps, and wheelarch spoilers but with a standard 1.6 litre engine. Charting decrypted Enigma traffic against British shipping losses for a given month shows a strong pattern of increased losses when Naval Enigma was blacked out, and vice versa. As with the Mk1, there was a "warm hatch" version known as the Golf Driver. Even these brief periods were enough to markedly affect the course of the war. The MkII GTI failed to make the same waves as the MkI, and failed to win back the Golf GTI's fanbase which had adopted the Peugeot 205 GTI.

This technique was, at Bletchley, called gardening. The GTI was Motor Trend magazine's Car of the Year for 1985, as well as VWVortex's "Best Golf of all time". In the case of mining this or that channel, they expected the word "Minen" to occur in some of the messages. In europe it was offered with the acclaimed 112bhp 1.8 8v petrol engine, and in smaller numbers, the 75 bhp 1.6 GTD turbo diesel engine. To do this they would drop mines (or take some other action), then listen for messages thus provoked. It had more suspension travel, four-wheel drive, bullbars (generally over a single headlight grill), a skidplate for protecting the engine area, and a spare wheel mounted externally on the back. In other cases, the Allies induced the Germans to provide them with cribs. There was also a version called Golf Country, designed for light off-road driving.

More fantastic scenarios were contemplated, such as Ian Fleming's James Bondian suggestion to "crash" captured German bombers into the sea near German shipping, hoping they would be "rescued" by a ship's crew, which would be taken captive by commandos concealed in the plane who would capture the cryptographic material intact. These cars produced 212bhp, making them the most powerful VW Golfs ever produced, until the introduction of the MKIV Golf R32 in 2003. These included U-boats U-505 (1944) and U-559 (1942) and a number of German weather boats and converted trawlers such as the Krebs, captured during a raid on the Lofoten Islands off Norway. In 1989, these cars cost in the region of £25,000 each and were primarily sold to VAG executives and management, although a few exist in Britain as of 2005. Naval Enigma machines or settings books were captured from a total of 7 U-boats and 8 German surface ships. It is rumored that two models were produced with air conditioning. And it was done again shortly afterwards. All of these special edition models came in black, with four doors (except two in three door), a plain two-headlight grille (not the usual GTI four headlights) and a unique blue grille detail (not red, as the GTI) and motorsport badges.

On 7 May 1941 the Royal Navy deliberately captured a German weather ship, together with cipher equipment and codes; and 2 days later U-110 was captured, together with an Enigma machine, code book, operating manual and other information that enabled Bletchley Park to break submarine messages until the end of June. Designed and built by the Volkswagen Motorsport division, only 70 of these "G60 Limited" models exist; featuring a unique number and plaque, the G60 supercharger was combined with the 16-valve GTI engine, mated to a sports transmission and Syncro four wheel drive mechanism. Different and far more difficult methods had to be used to break into Naval Enigma traffic, and with the U-boats running freely in the Atlantic after the fall of France, a more direct approach recommended itself. A very limited edition hand-built Golf II variant exists, including all of the best features available at the time. There was no hint at all to the initial settings for the machines, and there was little probable plaintext to use, either. The second-generation Golf was launched in 1983 (launched in North America in 1985) and featured a larger bodyshell and a wider range of engine options, including a GTD (In euro markets, using the 1.6 'umwelt' diesel engine), a DOHC 16-valve version of the straight-four GTI (as well as the tried and tested 1800 8v GTi), the supercharged 8v "G60" and a racing homologated variant of this, the "Rallye". From the beginning, the Naval version of Enigma used a larger selection of rotors than did the Army or Air Force versions, as well as operating procedures that made it much more secure than other Enigma variants. The vinyl tops were insulated and manually operated, with a glass rear window.

In the summer of 1940, British cryptanalysts, who were successfully breaking German Air Force Enigma-cypher variants, were able to give Churchill information about the issuing of maps of England and Ireland to the Sealion invasion forces. for Karmann to install. Liaison officers were appointed for each field command to manage and control dissemination. The A1 Volkswagen convertible is of unibody construction built entirely at the factory of Karmann, from stamping to final assembly; Volkswagen supplied the engine, suspension, interior, etc. The distribution of Ultra information to Allied commanders and units in the field involved considerable risk of discovery by the Germans, and great care was taken to control both the information and knowledge of how it was obtained. It had a reinforced body, transverse roll bar, and a high level of trim. The British were, it is said, more disciplined about such measures than the Americans, and this difference was a source of friction between them. The convertible version, named the Cabriolet, was sold from 1980 to 1993 (a convertible version of the Golf II was not made, so the Mk1 cabrio with slight modification was produced until the introdcution of the Mk III cabrio).

Ultra information was used to attack and sink many Afrika Korps supply ships bound for North Africa; but, as in the North Atlantic, every time such information was used, an "innocent" explanation had to be provided: often scout planes were sent on otherwise unnecessary missions, to ensure they were spotted by the Germans. In 2004, Sports Car International announced the GTI Mk I as the 3rd best car of the 1980s. This was taken to the extreme that, for instance, though they knew from intercepts the whereabouts of U-boats lying in wait in mid-Atlantic, the U-boats often were not hunted unless a "cover story" could be arranged — a search plane might be "fortunate enough" to sight the U-boat, thus explaining the Allied attack. It was one of the first small cars to adopt fuel injection for its sports version, which raised power output of the 1588 cc engine to 110 PS (81 kW/108 hp). The Allies were seriously concerned to conceal from the Axis command that they had broken into Enigma traffic. The GTI version, launched in Europe 1976 and the US in 1983, created a whole new type of car, the hot hatch, and was widely copied by all other manufacturers since. Usable Ultra information came too late to be of great help during the Battle of Britain. A version of this original Golf model, known as the Volkswagen CitiGolf, is still produced in South Africa as an entry level car.

Instead the Germans every so often added new rotors to the mix, thereby allowing the British to work out the wirings of the newest rotors. The Golf was designed by Italian automobile architect / designer Giorgetto Giugiaro, of the ItalDesign design studio. However, due to the expense and difficulty of getting new rotors to all ships and units, this was never done. While the Golf was not the first design with this layout (earlier examples being the Austin Maxi in the late 1960s and the Fiat 128 3P of the early 1970s), it was very successful, especially since it married these features with Volkswagen's reputation for solid build-quality and reliable engineering. And had German operating practices been more secure, things would have been much more difficult for the British cryptologists. The Golf was Wheels magazine's Car of the Year for 1975. Had the Germans ever replaced every rotor at the same time, the British might not have been able to break back into the system. Marketed in the United States and Canada from 1975 to 1984 as the Volkswagen Rabbit and in Mexico as the Volkswagen Caribe, it featured the water-cooled, front wheel drive design pioneered by the Citroën Traction Avant with the addition of a hatchback pioneered by the Renault 4.

Other German operators used "form letters" for daily reports, notably weather reports, so the same crib might be used every day. The first Golf began production in 1974. Analysts were set to finding such messages in the sea of daily intercepts, which winnowed out enough possibilities to allow Bletchley to use other original Polish techniques as well to find the initial daily keys. The Golf was the central product of this new strategy. In other cases, as they had before the war, Enigma operators would constantly use the same settings for their message keys, often their own initials or those of a girlfriend (one apparently had the initials "C.I.L.," so Bletchley Park named such hints "cillies"). Volkswagen had acquired the Ingolstadt company in 1964 from Daimler-Benz, and crucially gained access to Audi's expertise in water-cooled engines and front wheel drive which were needed to produce a new generation of Volkswagens. A British analyst received from an intercept station a long message containing not a single "T" and immediately realised what had happened. The savior of the German car giant came in the form of Auto Union, which owned the famous Audi brand.

In one instance, a clerk was asked to send a test message, and hit the T key repeatedly and transmitted the resulting letters. The Type 3 and Type 4 failed to attract any interest, whilst the NSU-developed K70 was an unmitigated disaster. On some occasions, German cipher clerks helped the Allied cryptanalysts. Beetle sales were in terminal decline, and car buyers increasingly turned away from Volkswagen's air-cooled, rear-engined models. This provided a clue to message keys. The Golf was also a crucial model for Volkswagen itself; by the early 1970s, the company was in serious financial trouble. With a probable plaintext fragment and the knowledge that no letter could be enciphered as itself, a corresponding ciphertext fragment could often be identified. It created the concept of a hot hatch.

Another technique counted on common German phrases, such as "Heil Hitler" or "please respond," which were likely to occur in a given plaintext; a successful guess as to a plaintext was known at Bletchley as a crib. The Golf is a historically important automobile, as it has been in continuous production from 1974 to the present day. One mode of attack on the Enigma relied on the fact that the reflector (a patented feature of the Enigma machines) guaranteed that no letter could be enciphered as itself, so an A could not be sent as an A. . 31, 58.). They have existed everywhere between basic personal cars and high-performance sports coupes. (Kozaczuk, pp. 5-door hatchback, station wagon (estate) and convertible (Cabrio) variants have also been available, as well as a sedan (saloon) car based on the Golf (see Volkswagen Jetta).

Even before the war, it had been a challenge to the Poles; only a portion of Naval Enigma had been read at B.S.-4 (the Cipher Bureau's German section) due to limited Bureau personnel and resources and because knowledge of army and air force traffic had been deemed more important to Poland's defense. Most production of the Golf has been in the 3-door hatchback style. (For a discussion of the many identical techniques used by the Poles and the British, see Kozaczuk 1984, appendix F.) A particular challenge would be German Naval Enigma. That title remains firmly with its brother, the Beetle. British attacks on the Enigmas were similar to the original Polish methods, but naturally continued evolving to keep pace with the growing complexity of German equipment and procedures. Considering that the only thing sucessive generations of the Volkswagen Golf have in common is the name and a vague similarity, its claim to "the best selling car of all-time worldwide" is dubious at best. Such information enabled the Allies to maintain an accurate picture of enemy plans and orders of battle, and when appropriately used was of great value in formulating Allied strategy and tactics. The Golf is Volkswagen's best-selling badge in history, with more than 24 million built as of 2005[1].

By 1943, a large proportion of intercepts (over 2,000 daily at the height of operations) were routinely read, including some from Hitler himself. The Volkswagen Golf is an automobile manufactured by Volkswagen. Among the latter was Alan Turing, one of the founders of modern computing. The Bletchley Park workers included a mix of crossword enthusiasts, chess mavens, mathematicians and pioneer computer scientists. Such was the secrecy surrounding reports from "Boniface" that "his" reports were taken directly to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a locked box to which he personally held the key.

Earlier in the war, the product from Bletchley Park was codenamed "Boniface" to give the impression to the uninitiated that the source was a secret agent. Eventually there would be a very large organization controlling the distribution of the resulting – secret – decrypted information, which in time came to be called "Ultra." Strict rules were established to restrict the number of people who knew about the existence of Ultra in the hope of ensuring that nothing (e.g., leaks, actions) would alert the Axis powers that the Allies were reading their messages. They also set up a large interception network to collect enciphered messages for the cryptologists at Bletchley and at five near-by off-site outstations at Adstock, Gayhurst, Wavendon, Stanmore, and Eastcote. (Work that would be done after the outbreak of World War II in France, at PC Bruno outside Paris, would be strictly the domain of the Polish Cipher Bureau cryptologists who had escaped Poland.) Early in 1939 Britain's secret service had installed its Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, 50 miles (80 km) north of London, to work on enemy message traffic.

Armed with this Polish assistance, the British began work on German Enigma traffic. Since neither the French nor the British had succeeded in breaking Enigma traffic, this was a major windfall for Poland's western allies. This happened during the famous meeting at Pyry, in the Kabaty Woods south of Warsaw, on July 25, 1939. Well before 1938, much German Enigma traffic was being routinely decrypted by the Poles; but accelerating changes in German operations (encipherment procedures, frequency of key changes, greater rotor choice) and looming war led the Poles to share their achievements in Enigma decryption with France and England.

They designed working "doubles" of the Enigmas and developed equipment and techniques which helped in finding the keys needed for decryption (including the "grill," "clock," cyclometer, cryptologic bomb, and perforated sheets). Together with two colleagues at the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau (Polish: Biuro Szyfrów), he went on to develop practical methods of decrypting Enigma traffic. The 27-year-old mathematician used advanced mathematics (group theory, particularly permutation theory) for the first time to crack the Enigma system. The fundamental break into the Enigma systems that were to be used by Nazi Germany was made in Poland in 1932, just on the eve of Adolf Hitler's accession to power, by Marian Rejewski.

Dilly Knox, of GC&CS, is said to have broken it during the 1920s. The commercial versions were not so secure. Each variant required different cryptanalytic treatment. The German Army, Navy, Air Force, Nazi party, Gestapo, and German diplomats all used Enigma machines, but there were several variants (eg, the Abwehr used a four-rotor machine without a plugboard, and Naval Enigma used different key management from that of the Army or Air Force, making its traffic far more difficult to cryptanalyze).

These messages were generated on several variants of an electro-mechanical rotor machine called "Enigma." The Enigma machine was widely thought to be in practice unbreakable in the 1920s, when a variant of the commercial Model D was first used by the German Navy. Ultra material largely came from German cipher traffic. . Eisenhower, as at war's end describing Ultra as having been "decisive" to Allied victory in World War II.

Winterbotham, in The Ultra Secret (1974), quotes the western Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight D. F.W. Although the volume of messages read from this system was much smaller than that from the Enigma, they more than made up for it in their importance. It was eventually attacked using the Colossus, considered to be the forerunner of the electronic programmable digital computer.

These also were broken, particularly TUNNY, which the British thoroughly penetrated. Several distinct systems were used, principally the Lorenz SZ 40/42 (initially code-named TUNNY) and Geheimfernschreiber (code-named STURGEON). Later the Germans began to use several stream cipher teleprinter systems for their most important traffic, to which the British gave the generic code-name FISH. For some time thereafter, "Ultra" was used only for intelligence from this channel.

Until the name "Ultra" was adopted, there were several cryptonyms for intelligence from this source, including Boniface. Much of the German cipher traffic was encrypted on the Enigma machine, hence the term "Ultra" has often been used almost synonymously with "Enigma decrypts.". The name arose because the code-breaking success was considered more important than the highest security classification available at the time (Most Secret) and so was regarded as being Ultra Secret. The term eventually became the standard designation in both Britain and the United States for all intelligence from high-level cryptanalytic sources.

Ultra (sometimes capitalised ULTRA) was the name used by the British for intelligence resulting from decryption of German communications in World War II. page 202. ISBN 0747570787. ^  Fredrick Taylor Dresden:Tuesday 13 February 1945, Pub (NY): HarperCollins, ISBN 0060006765, Pub (Lon): Bloomsbury.

Her account appears in Sebag-Montefiore's book. The fate of the German Enigma spy "Asché" was not publicly known till Hugh Sebag-Montefiore tracked down Asché's daughter about 1999. Sixth, many writers have not done their research. The account was claimed to have been written from the unpublished memoirs of an Australian cryptanalyst, but substantive parts of the published version appear to have been simply invented.

At least one incident is known of whole-cloth fabrication regarding British cryptanalytic progress on a particular World War II Japanese Navy cryptosystem. Fifth, several authors have had agendas which took precedence over accuracy in their reports. Fourth, governments have chosen to keep secret or release information to serve their own purposes, not historical accuracy or completeness. In any case, none of them were originally written, nor made available later, with historical clarity in mind; considerable perspective is required to make reasonable use of them.

Those not actually lost have taken decades to be released to the public, and some are, presumably, still to be released. Third, documents have been 'lost' in secret archives. It requires someone with a considerable understanding of cryptanalysis, and of Enigma, to adequately comprehend -- or explain -- how either worked. Second, the cryptanalytic work was tricky and quite technical.

Peter Calvocoressi's book, Top Secret Ultra, contains a sounder account of the episode. The story about Churchill deliberately not interfering with a Luftwaffe bombing of Coventry which was known through Enigma decrypts is one such. Several books have been published by those on the Ultra distribution side at Bletchley Park, but work there was seriously compartmentalised, making it difficult to credit some episodes when they are due only to such a source. First, not all the authors were in a position to know.